


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July 1944



Marketing activities

WAR FOOD ADMINISTRATION Office of Distribution

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1. Which came first, chicken or egg? 2. Why does the chicken cross the road? Here were two questions, anyway, that didn't come up during this year's Battle of the Eggs . . . but a lot of others did.

MAN BEHIND THE LABEL

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This story puts us in mind of the time we sent 25 cents for an advertised sure-fire killer of ants, flies, and other small household game. By return mail we received two checker-size wooden chips and the polite, painstaking instructions: "Force offending animal to take a position between execution blocks and firmly press them upon him until he is dead. To prevent dying in the house, follow these directions in the back yard."

POST-WAR DISPOSAL OF U. S. FOOD STOCKS

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With the war crashing toward its climax, businessmen's minds are turning to the days when Government will release its stocks of materials. Not the smallest stock pile is food. Here the author steps into the problem-packed future for a quick look around.

WAR CUTS SOME ICE

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Question: Why is ice like our servicemen? *Answer:* Because as compared with other days there is more of it, it's doing more unaccustomed jobs, and more of it is on the go.

NEW MARKET FOR COTTON

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Here's a new way to use up part of the hard-to-sell low qualities of our annual cotton crop. This story should be disquieting news for that old ogre Surplus, who doubtless is planning even now to rear his ugly head after the war.

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Address all inquiries to
Elbert O. Umsted
Editor, Marketing Activities
War Food Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

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Sunny Side Up

by Sophia Podolsky

When the Government asked for more eggs in 1944, how could it know that the Nation's hens had decided to fly an "E" flag from every hen-nery? But that's what happened--and the flags were run up faster than civilians could run off the eggs.

You can't decree a moratorium on something as basic as egg-laying. You can't issue an ultimatum to patriotic hens. Instead, the Government stepped into the nest and accomplished a buying and selling job that deserves more than passing mention in the annals of Federal doings.

Let's glance back to January 1943. The United States had been in a world war for a year. Eggs were in demand for the services, civilians, lend-lease commitments; more eggs than had ever been produced. To meet demand WFA upped its goals, asked farmers to step up production. By mid-December 1943 the Government got its answer--a *deluge*.

How come the farmers exceeded their goals by over 6 percent? How did egg production rise 58 percent above peacetime performance? How, with only 6 percent more hens on farms last January, could farmers collect 17 percent more eggs that month? The answers to these questions involve three factors.

First, the mild winter weather deceived the hens into thinking spring had come. Spring is when we fulfill our obligations, they thought, and proceeded to toss off a good share of the 5½ billion dozen eggs anticipated in all of 1944. Next there was a higher percentage of young pullets in farm flocks, resulting from the all-time peak hatchings during the spring of 1943. A third factor, rarely mentioned, was the increase in back-yard flocks. "If a Victory Garden is in order, why not a Victory Flock?" asked Joe Doakes. "There'll be eggs for me and my neighbors." This back-yard increase wasted feed and added volume to the egg flood.

When we were building and producing for national defense, Congress directed the War Food Administration to support egg prices and prices of other commodities for the farmer who produced them. In effect it said: "You're asking for these eggs. You'll get them. But you will have to put a cushion under them, to protect the farmer against possible ruin-

ously low prices while production is becoming adjusted to peacetime levels."

The Steagall amendment, effective July 1, 1941, was the legal instrument by which WFA supported prices and stabilized markets so farmers could maintain production at necessary levels. Under it, WFA is committed to support farm prices for at least 2 calendar years after the war ends.

The price of eggs varies according to size, grade, and season. The farmer who sells better eggs and is closer to consumer markets receives better prices for them. Moreover, there are seasonal fluctuations; prices are higher in winter than in spring and summer.

In the spring and summer of 1944, with eggs running out of everybody's ears, prices began to weaken. At first, WFA bought only graded eggs, paying different prices based on grade and locality. With the surplus increasing daily, and prices sagging, WFA moved its program close to the farmer, decided on a flat national price of 26 cents for nest-run eggs, accepted all offers. Later, the price was upped to 27 cents. This does not mean that WFA stopped buying graded eggs at correspondingly higher prices. If a farmer somewhere could get 35 cents, so much the better, but WFA wanted to insure each farmer a floor.

Under WFA's support program, eggs were not to be bought directly from farmers. This would have involved duplicating or taking over the whole egg-marketing structure, or establishing in every town and hamlet a marketing system owned and operated by the Government. The Government had no intention of going into the egg business permanently. WFA meant to utilize the facilities, personnel, and experience of existing agencies.

Program Not a Panacea

Here it should be pointed out that WFA did not consider its price-support program as the solution of all egg problems. It wasn't a magic carpet to bring markets to the farmer's hennery, nor was it a wand that went *whisssst!* and made all eggs the same size, grade, and color. As for additional shipping or processing facilities, devise a price-support program that can conjure up these and you're a made man.

Two weeks after the surplus appeared, WFA started its purchase program. It started buying dried eggs 6 weeks earlier than had been contemplated. From January through June it bought more than 180 million pounds of dried whole egg powder for 1944 lend-lease uses. For the year, WFA's dried egg purchases will amount to at least 185 million pounds (equivalent to 18½ million cases of shell eggs). These purchases would have been made even had a surplus not developed, but they have nevertheless been a strong factor in supporting producer prices.

WFA officials met with the dried egg people and announced that contracts would be determined on a cost-plus basis. As a result, egg

driers have been required to base their selling price to WFA on the prices they pay for shell eggs, plus their actual cost of conversion and a reasonable profit. In addition, WFA required certification that at least specified support prices had been paid to producers.

The surplus showed up first in the Northeast. As it spread, WFA extended its buying across the United States, soon was buying carlots on the basis of 14 grades at announced prices from any handler who could assemble a carlot of 600 cases, 30 dozen to the case. In areas where there were not enough eggs and carlot shippers for operation under the original carlot program, WFA changed its specifications so shippers could offer carlots of mixed grades.

By mid-April the hens were still running up "E" flags. The surplus which regular civilian and wartime markets couldn't absorb got so large that WFA resorted to the appointment of buying agents authorized to buy at support prices any quantity of straight-run current receipt eggs from producers, dealers, storekeepers, and others. "Current receipt eggs" are the ungraded, run-of-the-nest eggs delivered by farmers to county buyers and producer plants. Manifestly, they are good, bad, and indifferent.

WFA had now moved its price-support program as close to the farmer as possible, yet it continued to use existing marketing facilities. After the agents certified they had paid producers 27 cents for the nest-run eggs, they could sell them to WFA at 3½ cents extra if the eggs were packed in used cases or 4½ cents in new cases.

Bottlenecks

Surpluses continued . . . more and more eggs without hint of let-up. As WFA dug, three bottlenecks developed. They were all shortages--of storage, cases, and labor. Cold-storage space was very tight. Refrigerator cars were scarce, labor to grade eggs was scarcer, and egg cases were scarcer than hens' teeth.

By now, every time a WFA official opened his desk drawer an egg popped out. Then . . . 1,400 freight cars were sitting on Midwestern tracks. Fourteen hundred cars, stacked high with 25 million dozen eggs, sitting there in the sun without a home.

They hadn't appeared suddenly. They were the accumulation of many weeks. One hundred cars the first week, 500, then 800, finally 1,400 cars, with headaches throbbing on a rising note.

The nest-run eggs were dubious to begin with. Something had to be done quickly, and was done. Most of the 1,400 cars rolled to consumers, egg freezers, and egg driers. A few--225 cars to be exact--were sold for livestock feed when storage space could not be found. Thus even this fraction of the 1,400 cars escaped becoming a dead loss and helped out in a critical feed situation.

Meanwhile, WFA and the egg industry were pushing the biggest consumer egg drive of its kind ever. Press, radio, magazines begged consumers to eat 1 more egg a week for 6 weeks and solve the problem.

The egg was glamorized. How admirably it went with peppers, tomatoes, mushrooms, liver, and jellies! It could be hard-cooked, deviled, fried, poached, scrambled, baked, tossed in a toddy, dropped in a soup, beaten in a borsch. Besides being rich in protein, it was an important source of iron, calcium, phosphorous, and of the vitamins A, B₁, niacin, and riboflavin.

Producer and consumer organizations, dairy and poultry associations, hotels and restaurants, wholesalers and retailers were made directly aware of the emergency. Not a trick was missed, not even the man-to-man appeal to each housewife to put an extra carton in her refrigerator. The first day after the appeal, 13 Washington stores declared themselves eggless.

In early June the hens let up. Cackling and production declined seasonally. Prices firmed up. By now, more eggs were going through normal channels. At last WFA could lay low on buying for the moment, catch its breath . . . and take stock.

Taking Stock

When you add the figures up, you are aware that the Government has done a mighty buying job. WFA bought more than 6 million cases of shell eggs (30 dozen eggs per case) from January through June 1944 to fulfill its promise to support producer prices.

The question of subsidy during that period was often a headache for WFA officials. "Why do you boys bother your noodle so?" they were asked. "Why not let the farmers get any old price, and pay them the difference between what they get and the support price?" Why? Because such a deal would have cost WFA around a cool 195 million dollars--if farmers had had to sell their eggs 10 cents (a conservative estimate) below floor price.

What WFA did was invest 50 million dollars to support the price. Out of this it can lose at most 10 million dollars. On the other hand it may come out even, because the selling price to the trade is gradually going up. In August, when the hens run down their "E" flags, WFA will know for sure whether it's the red or black flag that goes up. One thing is certain: The Government really went in with its fists up and did a buying job that fulfilled all its commitments.

But this isn't all. Now the Government is doing a *selling* job. It's selling those eggs back to the trade--principally to egg driers--at the ceiling price. On July 1, some 950 cars had gone back.

Moreover, it has completed arrangements (see p. 18) for leasing a limestone mine where Government-owned lard, eggs, and other perishables

will be stored. The estimated 12 million cubic feet of space is equivalent to about 9 percent of all public cooler space in the country.

Prospects are cheerful. WFA has stopped buying current receipt shell eggs. Out of 10,000 carloads of eggs purchased by WFA, 3,000 have been disposed of thus far--to school lunch, institutional users, driers, freezers, and others. Current receipt eggs, of which nearly 3 million cases were bought, are being sold to drying plants at ceiling prices.

In addition, WFA-owned shell eggs are moving into breaking plants. Nearly 500 carloads have been broken for freezing since the program started. These frozen eggs will be held by WFA as a backlog for drying, or for disposal later in the season.

While none of WFA's graded eggs have been sold so far, they are now being inspected and regraded. The top quality eggs will be fed to the market gradually to prevent a shortage in fall and winter.

Why the Difference Between Farm and Retail Prices?

Finally, let's take up a question that has bothered a lot of people. Why are retail prices so far above farm prices? Why must the consumer pay for a dozen eggs more than twice what the farmer gets?

There are two answers. Between the producer and consumer of eggs is the candler. It takes labor to candle eggs. This labor has been scarce and inefficient. It also takes procurement costs, packing costs, transportation and storage, to say nothing of such losses as breakage and depreciation. The outlet of graded eggs just about equaled what the consumer would purchase at ceiling prices. In other words, the retailer was in a position to sell all his candled eggs at the hilt of his ceiling.

It's only fair to say that many dealers sold their eggs substantially below ceiling, but there were enough wholesalers and retailers asking and receiving the fixed ceiling price to make it plain that the profit for top-quality eggs was excessive. It is also only fair to say that to sell at the ceiling is no crime. It's not cricket, but it's not a crime.

There is another reason for the high wholesale price. Normal competition among wholesalers was lacking because the candled output was no greater than the market demanded. The procedure was to buy dirt cheap and sell as high as OPA would allow.

If everyone--all the way up the line--had sold according to what he paid for eggs, plus a nominal sum for handling, there would be no letters to WFA asking: "Why is it that I paid 56 cents for eggs today and the farmer only gets 27 cents?"

That's the end of the egg story. Except that if "E" is for Eggs, then "A" is for Achievement. The hens earned the "E," and to the egg industry and WFA belongs the "A."



Man behind the label

by Milt Mangum

Mix contents in 1 gallon of water and spray the infested plants.

These simple directions, if followed, will save millions of 1944 Victory Gardens and produce tons on hundreds of tons of additional food. Good soil, a well-prepared seed bed, enough yet not too much moisture, the right time and right depth of planting, then "dust and spray" is the gardener's simple formula for success.

But behind the dust and spray part someone must stand firmly to see that the dusts and sprays are not misbranded, misrepresented, or adulterated, and that they do what they are supposed to do. The man behind the label is Uncle Sam.

The Insecticide Division, a part of the Livestock and Meats Branch of War Food Administration's Office of Distribution, checks all the insecticides, fungicides, and disinfectants that move in interstate commerce. That doesn't mean every package gets opened, or that an inspector with a shiny badge makes a chemical analysis or even pokes his nose into every disinfectant bottle that crosses a State line. It does mean, though, that this little Division makes the most thorough attempt possible (within limits of time and personnel) to drag to light every case in which these products have been misbranded, adulterated, or misrepresented.

On the U. S. market today are some 12 to 15 thousand brands of insecticides, fungicides, and disinfectants. Besides bug killers to aid Victory gardeners, fruit growers, and farmers, there are moth repellents, ant killers, flea eradicators, chigger destroyers, germicides, bleaching fluids, treatments for athlete's foot. Most of these products are entirely reliable and if you follow the directions they will do what the manufacturers say they will. Too often, however, one shows up that won't. Let's glance at a few of the judgments secured under the In-

secticide Act. Take for instance the case of the "Lur-Em Moth Trap."

This trap consisted of a piece of woollen cloth saturated with sodium flouride and enclosed in folded cardboard. The user was directed to place three of these gadgets at various levels in the clothes closet --one on the floor and one each on the middle and top shelves. So placed, they were to be left for the unwary moths for 2 months--or 3 months if the weather was unseasonably cool. The idea was that after the mother moths had been lured into the trap and had laid their eggs, the newly hatched larvae would begin feeding on the cloth and so meet certain death. That was the idea but it didn't work. The court said "misbranded" because the device neither lured nor destroyed clothes moths.

"Hose Gun"

Then there was the hose gun, supposed to rid the garden of Japanese beetles. A cartridge, something like that used in carbonating water, was fitted in a "hose gun" and attached to the regular garden hose. All the consumer had to do was turn the stream on the plants and *presto!* the Japanese beetles turned up their toes and died. Or anyway, that's what the package statement said would happen--but the court didn't think so.

Another case had to do with a "Wonder" bean beetle and garden pest destroyer. The judgment notice reads: "The product was alleged to be misbranded in that statements 'garden pest destroyer' and 'to be applied with a powder duster' borne on the label . . . were false and misleading . . . so as to deceive and mislead the purchaser, since, when used as directed it would not destroy all garden pests." The product was condemned and the manufacturer drew a heavy fine.

In still another case, an analysis of a product branded "Pyrethrum Extract" showed that it consisted of a refined mineral oil distillate, some green coloring matter, and small amounts of chlorinated compounds. Whatever else it happened to be, it was not a *pyrethrum* extract.

Loss of the purchase price for these dubious and false products is small beside the loss of time and effort and the threat to health involved in applying them to garden plants, flowers, trees, clothes, and woodwork. When the bug blitz hits his tomatoes and beans, the Victory gardener has little time and money for experiments. "Can I be sure," he wants to know, "that this package of poison will kill bugs like it says here?" And the American housewife, scanning the label of a bottle of disinfectant, asks the drug-store clerk: "Can I rely on these directions?"

The answer is yes.

. . . . By Frederick V. Waugh

Many industries have begun to worry about the time when the Government stops buying materials and begins to dispose of them. To date, discussion of this subject has dealt mainly with industrial reconversion--the cutting down of tank production, for example, and the stepping up of automobile production--but in the past 6 months agriculture and the food manufacturing and distributing industries also have begun to take interest in the problem to the extent that the material to be disposed of is food.

A very important food buyer indeed during this war, the Government has bought food not only to supply our own military forces, but to help meet the needs of our allies as well. To do this job, this country had to expand its agricultural production and increase the output of its thousands of processing plants and food manufacturing concerns. Moreover, it had to maintain a sizable inventory of food both to provide so-called *working stocks* and to build up reserves against emergencies. So it is not hard to see that if the Government suddenly stopped buying food and liquidated all that it owns, the markets might be completely demoralized. Besides the great harm this would do food processors and distributors, it also might well bring on a general post-war agricultural depression.

Policy Problems

The farmer and the food manufacturer are concerned mainly with four policy problems.

1. *Rate of disposition.*--The aim should be to dispose of food in an "orderly" manner, by feeding the market just what it will absorb and no more. This does not mean, of course, that the Government should hoard huge stocks of food and refuse to sell them when they are needed. Such stocks held for long would be a continuous threat to the market because no one would know when they might suddenly be turned loose.

2. *Proportion released in the domestic market.*--Some of the food now owned by the Government may be shipped abroad for relief feeding; some may go to commercial exporters. One important policy question is to determine how much food will be sold to U. S. civilians.

3. *Methods of sale.*--The food manufacturing and distributing industries naturally are concerned with the methods and procedures by which foods will be released in the domestic market. It seems generally agreed that such foods should move through regular trade channels and--to obviate the danger that a few speculators might get hold of enormous blocks of foods not available to their competitors--that foods should be sold openly and competitively.

4. *Prices.*--Most important of all, the farmer, the food processor, and the food distributor are concerned with price policies. They

want to be sure Government agencies will not dump food on the market at low prices.

Disposition of Government food stocks is not entirely a *post-war* problem. In fact, the first food processors to become interested in the matter were thinking of it in terms of 1944 production. They felt somewhat uncertain about the Government's program for disposing of foods. Before making plans for their 1944 output they wanted some assurance of an orderly disposition program and reasonable prospects of a stable price.

Moreover, it is entirely unrealistic to think of this problem in terms of our suddenly selling food stocks on the day the war is over. From time to time the Government is already selling foods, and for various reasons it will doubtless make further sales. For example, the estimates of its requirements may not be entirely accurate. Again, the shipping situation may prevent our exporting foods that we intended to sell abroad; or storage space may become scarce; or perishable foods may become threatened with spoiling. For these reasons and others the Government is disposing of some foods now and will continue during the war. Whether the war ends abruptly or gradually, the foods owned by the Government should be released systematically over a period of months and perhaps even years.

Another Reason

There is another reason why food stocks disposition is an immediate problem. Our policies on the subject will necessarily affect our current policies on set-aside orders and on procurement generally. The set-aside orders require food processors to reserve a certain portion of their output. These processors are not allowed to sell this portion to anyone except the Government, yet they have no definite assurance that the Government will take it. In fact, it has been common practice to release some of the foods which were under set-aside orders and to let the processors sell them. And the processors are of course very glad to have these foods released--so long as the market will absorb all the foods it can get at ceiling prices.

Our biggest wartime food problem has been, and will continue to be, the maintenance of a high rate of food production, manufacture, and distribution. The agricultural goals program has succeeded remarkably well to date. A concrete and practicable program for handling set-aside foods and disposing of Government-owned food stocks will do perhaps as much as any other thing to maintain this high level.

In the fall of 1943, a number of food industry committees became interested in the subject of disposing of Government food stocks. Some of them set up special committees to study the problem and to recommend programs and legislation. About the same time, a committee was appointed within the Food Distribution Administration (now the Office of Distribution of the War Food Administration) to study the situation and work with the industry committees.

It was not possible at that time (and still is not) to release to the public detailed figures on current and prospective Government-owned food stocks. The Government committee and the industry committees had to stick to principles rather than analyze the actual situation. It soon became very clear that a single Government agency should dispose of all food stocks. Only thus would it be possible to carry out a food disposition program that would be fair to farmers, consumers, processors, and taxpayers.

While these committees were still at work, the Surplus War Property Administration was established. This Administration will "have general supervision and direction of the handling and disposition of surplus war property." The Executive order under which it was set up and its own Order No. 1 makes it clear that disposition of surplus food will be the responsibility (under the general supervision of the Surplus War Property Administration) of the War Food Administration.

A Procurement and Price Support Branch was recently set up within WFA's Office of Distribution. Formerly, food procurement was handled by the nine commodity branches. At present, the commodity branches initiate proposed programs for price-support activities, but proposals are coordinated and largely carried out by the Office of Distribution's new Procurement and Price Support Branch.

Purchase Limit

Under the new arrangement, food is being bought according to known requirements of the armed services, lend-lease, and other governmental programs. Early in the war, the building of reserve stocks got a lot of attention, and at the time it was a necessary emphasis. For months it was difficult to get as much food to ship as we wanted. But from now throughout the war, that emphasis may shift a good deal. We will reach a limit beyond which the building of further stocks will be undesirable or even impossible. Therefore, it becomes more important than ever for us to determine our requirements accurately and as far in advance as possible, and that we gear our procurement with known, definite requirements.

A word about the current policies of the Office of Distribution in disposing of food surpluses. The food releases now being made from time to time provide experience upon which a program may be built. They have shown, for example, that the original manufacturer should be allowed to buy back his own brand of food if he cares to. It has also shown some limitations of competitive bidding.

Most food processors and distributors are not watching Government announcements in order to bid on lots of food which may be released. That is true at present, at any rate. If the Office of Distribution should simply announce that a few cars of grapefruit juice or raisins would be sold next week to the highest bidder, it is quite possible that only a few bidders would be on hand. These bidders very likely would be speculators interested only if they could buy very low. As a result of this situation, the Office of Distribution has a sales job to do.

Therefore experienced men from the food industries have been brought recently into the Procurement and Price Support Branch to help do this job. They will try to keep the food industries fully informed about the foods that are to be released, and try to see that all elements of the trade have a chance to buy.

It is too early to map out food disposition policies. These policies doubtless will be clarified during the next few months by Congress, by the Surplus War Property Administration, and by the Office of Distribution. But this much we can foresee: WFA policies in this particular field must be closely related to some other broad policies of food and agriculture. We cannot possibly map a sound program for disposing of food stocks without at the same time mapping programs for agricultural production, food manufacturing, food stock piles, and relief feeding. These problems are tied together. They involve many different agencies in the United States and other countries. If we should have a very liberal policy of feeding the civilian populations of Europe and perhaps parts of Asia, and have the facilities for shipping the food, it is of course possible that we could continue indefinitely to produce at least as much food as we have produced during the past 2 years and still have no surplus to sell to U. S. consumers.

Not Simple

But the problem is not that simple. Relief feeding in Europe and perhaps other parts of the world will doubtless be important, but it will be limited. We should be very sure, it would seem, that we have reserve supplies adequate to meet the needs which may arise. It would not be safe to avoid the disposition problem by the expedient of a drastic cut in Government food procurement now. On the contrary, the Government should buy all the foods it really needs or is likely to need, but it should do so realizing its obligation to study its needs thoroughly, and to map a production and stock-piling program that will just about meet these needs with a fair margin of safety.

The program for disposing of Government-owned foods must be very closely coordinated with WFA's price-supporting activities. Congress has directed that the prices of most agricultural products be supported at 90 percent or more of parity price for a period of at least 2 years beyond the war. Farmers won't get parity prices merely because Congress passes a law. One of the main reasons advanced for turning over to WFA the job of disposing of these food surpluses was that WFA already was responsible for supporting prices. This is a strong argument. No Government agency could do an adequate job of supporting prices unless it also had authority and responsibility for disposing of food surpluses that either already existed or were acquired as a result of the price-support program.

Our most important post-war agricultural problem will be to develop a workable price-support program that will give reasonable safeguards to agricultural income and also help bring about desirable changes in agricultural production and food marketing. No such program can work

very long unless we have a means of moving surpluses into consumption. Just before the war we made a pretty good start toward solving this problem by means of food stamps, school lunches, direct distribution, school milk, 5-cent milk, and similar programs. After the war we shall have the job of disposing of Government-owned foods already stored up, plus that of handling surpluses resulting from expanded food production. In thinking about post-war disposition of Government foods, it is important to remember that this is a part of the broader problem of making necessary agricultural and marketing adjustments, and of maintaining satisfactory levels of farm income and agricultural prices.

Moreover, there is more to this problem than merely getting rid of any food surpluses that happen to exist. One of our first aims should be to reach and hold a high nutritional level in this country and, so far as possible, the world. Just before the war a fair start in this job was made in this and many other countries. We succeeded fairly well in improving the diets of undernourished people in a way which did not interfere with the usual distribution processes through ordinary trade channels. We made some progress in strengthening and stabilizing the farmer's prices while improving the diets of low-income families, school children, and similar groups.

In the international field we have not yet developed a satisfactory mechanism for doing this sort of job. Dumping, as it is commonly practiced, tends to disrupt international markets and to drive prices down. Yet it may be possible that through international commodity agreements, or similar mechanisms, we may be able to find a way to maintain a high level of food production and consumption by an arrangement for making foods more available to various undernourished groups throughout the world.

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FRESH PEAR ORDERS TERMINATED

War Food Orders 65 and 65.1, which restricted shipments of fresh Bartlett and Beurre Hardy pears from Washington, Oregon, and California during the 1943 season, were terminated by WFA as of July 1.

The orders were issued to prevent undue diversion from processing into fresh market channels. Under the orders, California shippers were prohibited from shipping out of that State for fresh consumption more of these pears than they shipped during 1942. Washington and Oregon shippers were limited to 75 percent of the quantity shipped for fresh consumption during 1942.

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SUPPLIES OF MOST VEGETABLE SEEDS AMPLE

WFA estimates that most kinds of vegetable seeds available for the fiscal year beginning July 1 will be ample to meet current requirements and provide millions of additional pounds for reserves.

WAR CUTS SOME ICE

. . . . By Bernell Winn

A block of ice in the hand is worth--well, it isn't worth a thing unless we can get it moved from where it was made to a point where and when we can use it.

Nowadays more than ever before, we use it as it moves. Ice has become the boon traveling companion of food. True, a little of it may still be found floating in tall drinks on the warm evenings, or clacking between metal and wood in crank freezers on back porches, but a whole lot more of it is keeping up the spirits of perishable U. S. food in transit at home and abroad.

Besides wartime distribution needs, another drain on our ice supply is the increasing population shifts that have overburdened the ice plants and truck and rail facilities in boom towns springing up around war factories.


Another drain on supply is the growing number of mechanical refrigerators that go out of service. The occurrence of these casualties, whether they are for the duration or only temporary, doesn't mean that the households affected will no longer have cold storage. Very often it means that a mechanical refrigerator must make room for an ice box, and consumption of ice mounts--a little at a time but it adds up big.

Sights Up

With ice needs rising, the production sights of the ice industry and State and national associations have been raised too. After planning originally to manufacture 47 million tons this year (up from 43 million tons in 1943), the industry now believes it will have to produce at least 50 million tons in 1944 to meet requirements.

During the past year certain production problems have been licked by plant expansions, equipment improvements, and better use of storage space, but the manpower problem remains. Unless the industry can have and hold enough key men for plant operations and enough semiskilled labor to pull, handle, and distribute the ice, the Nation's icing job won't get done. The manpower headache is biggest in summer, when ice manufacturers must multiply their winter forces by 3 or 4. Because the work is temporary, labor of any kind--let alone experienced labor--is hard to come by. Add to this the difficulty of getting trucks, tires, parts, and gasoline and you begin to see what the industry is up against.

But in spite of these difficulties the Ice Industry Advisory Committee (through which the industry presents its problems and suggestions to the War Food Administration) recently made this heartening report: "Provided sufficient labor is available, the . . . industry believes it has adequate production equipment and storage capacity . . . to meet the Nation's requirements."



New Market for Cotton

. . . By E. H. Omohundro

A new insulating material promises an annual market for much cotton of the qualities that are hardest to sell. Assuming that a tenth of all the U. S. cotton that might be used for insulation is so used, it is now estimated that the new product will consume half a million bales a year. When we consider that half a million bales equals one twenty-fourth of the average U. S. crop during the 5 years up to Pearl Harbor--and a much larger fraction of the hard-to-sell low-quality part of that crop--we get a rough idea of what the new insulating material may mean one day to surplus-haunted American cotton farmers.

Since 1940, when commercial manufacture was begun, public acceptance of cotton insulation has increased strikingly. In 1940 production of the product amounted to 55,000 pounds; in 1941, 769,000 pounds; in 1942, 1,746,000 pounds; and in 1943, 7,447,000 pounds. For 1944, a production goal of 60,000,000 pounds has been set.

Cotton insulation is being used today in homes, industrial buildings, and trailers, and it is beginning to be used in refrigerated warehouses, freight cars, and trucks. Experiments are being conducted looking to its use in household refrigerators, low-temperature cold storage, air- and marine-transportation equipment, and in other fields.

As an insulator, the product equals or excels any other material now commercially available. Weighing around three-quarters of a pound per cubic foot, it is lighter than any other insulation in general use. A thousand square feet of it, by 3 inches thick, weighs a mere 200 pounds. This lightness gives it a big advantage in the transportation field.

Cotton insulation is live and springy, and after insulation it usually gets thicker--provided it is made of sound fibers and properly installed. It is manufactured in batts as thick, wide, and long as the buyer specifies, and may be purchased unmounted or mounted on one or both sides. Mounted cotton insulation has never been known to settle after installation.

The new product does not attract household vermin, or harm or irritate the human skin. It has been floated in water for as long as 6 months without showing mildew or any deterioration of the fibers or their insulating properties. After water-soaked fibers have been frozen solid, thawed out, and allowed to dry, they again become resilient with no tendency to fall apart.

Cotton insulation is given a flame-resistance treatment and tested with an 1,800° F. torch flame. Recently, when a sample of the material which had been in use since 1940 was retested, it was found to resist flame as hardily as ever.

Chances are that cotton insulation manufacture will develop into a self-supporting industry, but during the development period the War Food Administration is making incentive payments to approved manufacturers.

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TEXAS CITRUS FRUIT HARVEST SEASON EXTENDED BY CHANGES IN MEXICAN FRUITFLY QUARANTINE RULES

Grapefruit, sweet limes, and "sour" and "bittersweet" oranges may be harvested for interstate shipment from the regulated area in the lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas from September 1 through June 15 each year, and commercial varieties of sweet oranges throughout the year, the United States Department of Agriculture said recently in announcing a revision of the Mexican fruitfly quarantine regulations.

As in the past, the Chief of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine is authorized to modify these harvest periods from year to year to meet changing conditions, and he also may require sterilization of the fruit before interstate movement.

When produced under conditions rendering them free from fruitfly infestation, all citrus fruits (except lemons and sour limes, on which there are no such restrictions) may be shipped interstate from the regulated area under Federal permit. These modified harvest periods had been authorized for the 1944 season under administrative instructions of the Chief of the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine issued on September 23, 1943. A fruit-free period between harvests is required to prevent fruitfly infestation.

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MAY LEND-LEASE DELIVERIES REPORTED

During May, 1,060,963,642 pounds of food and other agricultural commodities were delivered under lend-lease and all other war programs, WFA reports. This included shipside deliveries destined for our allies, cash sales to the armed forces and other governmental agencies, supplies for the Caribbean and Territorial Emergency Programs, and direct distribution to civilian groups.

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RICE MILLING INDUSTRY ADVISORY GROUP MEETS

Meeting in Washington recently, the Rice Milling Industry Advisory Committee discussed plans for distributing the 1944-45 rice crop and recommended a reduction in the percentage set aside for the Government.

LIMESTONE MINE TO HOLD GOVERNMENT FOOD STOCKS

Having completed arrangements to lease a 75-year-old limestone mine near Atchison, Kans., the War Food Administration plans to convert the mine's estimated 12 million cubic feet of space into a storage vault for Government-owned lard, eggs, and other perishables.

The project includes installation of refrigerator machinery that will reduce the mine temperature, normally about 50° F., to between 30° and 32°. It will be the largest single cooler storage "house" in the United States, with a total cubic capacity equal to about 9 percent of all public cooler space in the country and sufficient to hold 3,000 to 3,500 carloads of food (60,000 to 75,000 tons, depending on density). Naturally insulated with 100 feet of earth and stone, the huge, dry space has railroad sidings and other appointments of a well-kept warehouse.

WFA officials, hoping to place a part of the mine in operation by August 1, estimate that use of the space will result in considerable savings annually to the Government. Construction of a building with the same amount of floor space would cost approximately \$15,000,000, whereas it is estimated that the Atchison project will cost about one-tenth of this sum.

The project will ease the present critical shortage of cooler space. It will provide space for a wide variety of agricultural products, particularly products from the West and Far West in seasons of excess production. Officials predict also that it will simplify the problem of holding food supplies for eventual release to liberated countries.

Lard will be stored first, and then--as the vast interior becomes chilled--fat backs, salt meats and cured meats, dried fruits, dried eggs, and similar commodities.

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WFO 33 (GLYCERINE) REVOKED

Because satisfactory quantities of glycerine are now being obtained, WFA has revoked War Food Order 33, which prescribed standards for recovering glycerine from fats and oils split into fatty acids or made into soap. As a result, soap and fatty acid manufacturers need no longer file quarterly reports with WFA. The order was issued originally by the War Production Board on December 1, 1942, as M-193.

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GROWER SUPPORT PRICES FOR 3 DRIED FRUITS

Grower support prices for natural-condition dried apricots, pears, and peaches have been announced by WFA to encourage maximum production

of dried fruits for essential war needs. The prices which will be supported through an offer to purchase from growers are as follows:

APRICOTS	TYPE I GRADE C CENTS PER LB.	TYPE II GRADE C CENTS PER LB.	TYPE III GRADE C CENTS PER LB.
Jumbo	32½	31	29½
Extra Fancy	31½	30	28½
Fancy	30½	29	27½
Extra Choice	29½	28	26½
Choice	28½	27	25½
Standard	27½	26	24½
Slabs	27½	26	24½

Prices are a quarter of a cent a pound higher for Grade B and half a cent a pound higher for Grade A than the prices shown above. This schedule should result in a State average price of approximately 28 cents a pound if production of the various types, grades, and sizes is about normal.

PEARS	DOLLARS PER TON	PEACHES	DOLLARS PER TON
Lake County		Clingstone	330
quality	360	Freestone	440
Others	330		

The support program for these fruits is similar to that in effect during the 1942 and 1943 seasons. The entire pack will be set aside by packers to meet Government requirements. In view of anticipated large production of dried apricots, however, substantial supplies of this commodity will probably be released for civilians. Because of high Government requirements, only very small quantities of the three dried fruits have been released for civilian consumption during the past 2 years.

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TEA PACKERS HELD TO DELIVERY QUOTAS

Effective July 1, tea packers may no longer accept 1 1/3 times their quarterly delivery quotas of bulk tea. Instead, they may receive during any quarterly period only a quantity equivalent to their delivery quotas. In addition, however, any packer whose acceptances during a quota period are less than his delivery quota may make up the deficit in the next quarter. The quantity which packers may deliver has not been changed.

At any time during any quota period packers may deliver and whole-sale receivers may accept, in addition to their permissible quotas for that period, any unused portion of their quotas for the quota period immediately preceding. Formerly, packers were permitted the use of these carry-overs only during the first month of a quarterly period.

